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PEACE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

For shared détente, peace and security

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This report aims to contribute to the campaign "No to militarization and no to war.
For a Europe of détente, peace, and shared security"

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POR UNA POLÍTICA DE PAZ Y DESARME EN EUROPA

CENTRE DELÀS D'ESTUDIS PER LA PAU



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The war in Ukraine has accelerated the process of EU militarisation that's been simmering away since the doctrine of security and defence set out in the EU High Representative's 2003 *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, until 21 March 2022 when the European Council approved the *Strategic Compass for strengthening EU security and defence* by 2030. The military industry and arms lobbies have played a starring role in this process, promoting the construction of a 'Defensive Europe' based on injecting funds for the development and sale of arms.

It is perhaps for this reason that the EU's and its main powers' responses to Russia's invasion of large areas of Ukrainian territory on 24 February 2022, have been to increase the military budget in every Member State, in addition to increasing the EU defence budget, representing an **eminently military response to the conflict with Russia**.

The European Security and Defence budget has tripled from €6.5 billion (2007) to €19.5 billion under the current 2021-27 Multiannual financial framework programme. These figures do not include additional increases specifically related to the war in Ukraine, such as the European Peace Facility providing Ukraine with military support, whose value already reached €39 billion by September 2024.

Europe's military budget also attained record figures in 2023, when €289.3 billion was spent on military expenses: a 21.3% increase from 2022. When you add in the budgets of non-EU countries Norway and the United Kingdom (€77.323 billion combined), NATO's 2023 European military spending totalled €366.623 billion, coming in second place only to the world's top military spender (the USA), above China, and tripling Russia's military spending, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data. Europe is also the world's number two arms exporter (again after the USA). In 2022, EU countries exported military goods worth over €36 billion, of which €4.8 billion were sent to Ukraine. All this allows us to affirm that **the trend in Europe is a clear increase in both arms budgets and arms exports.**

The European response to the war in Ukraine is unquestionably conditioned by the influence of the United States and in the analysis

framework imposed by NATO, despite the fact that security needs on one side of the Atlantic are very different from those on the other. While war against Russia strengthens NATO's role and is economically beneficial to the USA, in Europe it inflicts a wound that comes with economic, and (above all) political and human costs that will impoverish Europe's future generations and make it harder to live in peace. Warmongering and militarism, obvious in a military organisation such as NATO, have become the norm in the EU and practically every Member State, who are also members of the Atlantic Alliance.

This report proposes **overcoming hegemonic warmongering policies in the EU now**, in order to overcome the military framework that encourages military spending and arms races, which have yet again proved incapable of avoiding war. The incompetence of those who have led European security on either side of the Atlantic is obvious. Although Russia's government has undertaken many actions and has great responsibilities, responsibility for this conflict also lies with the members of European national governments and EU security departments, who have been incapable of wiping war off the continental map.

A different security focus is needed to achieve real peace in Europe. A theoretical perspective can be used to build European security to achieve peace (which requires the absence of warmongering), based on recommendations from critical security studies, which must include feminist, environmental and decolonising perspectives. **We propose changing the focus of European security to include a vision of culture and peace that allows us to overcome our currently militarised, warmongering policies.**

We recommend abandoning the security policies based on war developed to date in Europe and switching to security policies that aim to achieve peace, which can include **positive peace, structural justice and the promotion of a culture of peace** rather than defence**, focused on life and biodiversity** rather than national security and elites.

Security for peace in Europe should be based on the kind of honest and true realism that overcomes the fallacy of the theory of misnomered 'realist' international relations. Realism gets things wrong when it insists that mistrust, chaos and confrontation are the only way for nations to relate. **It is unrealistic to believe that peace will be achieved by violent means.** Violence always, irredeemably, ends in more violence.

Security for peace in Europe must abandon deterrence and defence in favour of policies of international cooperation. We must switch away from threat analysis and the desire to pose a threat in order to achieve peace, towards **policies of détente and care for international relations between governments and peoples.**

USecurity for peace in Europe must be held up by the pillars of **global justice, internationalism, cooperation, fair trade and real decolonisation**, for us to walk towards a new, human geopolitics that's based on cooperation, in order to face our great global challenges from a position of human dignity.

Security for peace in Europe must be built from a position of independence from NATO and any other military organization or arms lobby. A policy of security for peace in Europe can only be created in a participatory and democratic manner, involving civil society, and in which the EU's founding values, including the promotion of peace, play a primary role.

This report aims to help build an alternative narrative and go beyond criticism of the policies that have brought Europe to the brink of war. It explores the theoretical foundations that can inspire this, and focuses on the opportunities provided by peace studies, which propose dedicating resources to preventing future wars, paying attention to their causes and boosting nations' non-militarised political tools in order to avoid war and improve relationships between nations and their peoples. We aim to contribute to the **No to militarization, no to war**[1] campaign, launched with the support of 300 organisations including the Delàs Centre, to expand the number of groups supporting the campaign in Spain and with the ambition of spreading the campaign to Europe.

1. The manifesto and members can be viewed at the following link: https://nomilitarism.eu/english/

INTRODUCTION

Simply checking the EU website allows us to see that the main principles and values 'underlying EU life' include freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, peace and stability. The European project may therefore be deemed a partial failure from the moment when it was unable to preserve peace on the continent. The war in Ukraine reveals the inefficiencies in our current security system and the incompetence of those who have led and implemented decisions about peace and security in Europe. In addition to Russia, the EU and her Member States are undeniably responsible for what has happened. Interpretations vary, and even contradict each other, depending on the analytical focus applied. We are aware that the hegemonic view of the conflict in Ukraine results from military doctrine and the warmongering culture that identifies Ukraine's lack of deterrents against attack or invasion by the Russian army as the cause of the war. However, as in many conflicts, things are not that simple: other countries with relatively low military capacities in similar situations have not been invaded by great powers. The response to the Ukrainian war is complex. This requires more detailed exploration from a critical peace and security perspective. Such an outlook is not the majority view, but we do not believe this makes it any less valid in helping to understand what happened. Indeed, it may be particularly relevant to finding alternatives to the hegemony of military security that could avoid war in Europe, this time around.

With this in mind, the Delàs Centre and the European Network Against Arms Trade (ENAAT) who are jointly publishing this report, decided to work together and reflect on the situation in order to provide an analysis of the degree of militarisation in Europe, which contributes to the expansion of war-based security (and vice versa). We wanted to consider

alternative options for European continental security in general, and in the EU in particular. These have arisen out of a peaceful focus and a culture of peace, which aim to not only avoid war but also to build the social, political and economic conditions that improve well-being and security for European citizens, from a perspective of positive peace.

To achieve this, we have divided the report into two sections. Section one provides evidence of the need to demilitarise Europe, using data about Europe's security and defence policies, military spending, arms trade, military industry and the proliferation of arms on the continent. This information points to the militarisation of our near future, which could push Europe still further from lasting peace, as despite the fact that the war in Ukraine will end sooner or later, the wound it will leave in those who experienced it, and society's consequent militarisation will be the greatest breeding ground for future wars.

The second section examines options for building security in Europe for peace rather than war, through humble efforts to achieve theoretical rigour. It explains the theoretical foundations and proposals of the main schools of thought in critical security studies, in order to uphold an alternative security focus that abandons warmongering and is based on a culture of peace in Europe. Finally, we propose specific focuses and measures to counter the warmongering economy and militarised deterrence policies that could push Europe's security compass towards a positive peace in which war ceases to be an option. The conclusions set out a series of recommendations that could materialise into specific internationally-minded, autonomous, policies that would change the course of European security policy, which has to date failed.

1. THE NEED TO DEMILITARISE EUROPE

1.1 THE MILITARY RACE TRIGGERED BY THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Pere Ortega

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, collective hysteria broke out among EU governors, who with very few exceptions, believe Vladimir Putin won't be satisfied with having attacked Ukraine and will invade other European countries. Such arguments rely on the assumption that Putin has territorial ambitions beyond Russia's borders and will have no qualms about triggering a European and global war. European leaders have thus committed to increasing defence investments, affirming this will lead to 'more security, more peace and more freedom in Europe.' Such declarations aim to justify the immense military spending triggered in their countries and affirm that only powerful military deterrence will allow Europe to feel secure, requiring greater investment and financing for the military industry, to produce more arms.

This European government paranoia was largely covered by the June 2022 NATO Summit agreement requiring a minimum (not maximum) 2% GDP spend on military expenses before 2029 (NATO, 2022). European countries have launched this rearmament, increasing military spending, approving the acquisition of new arms projects and asking the European Commission (EC) for subsidies and financing mechanisms to achieve it. Consequently, the EC implemented a range of support mechanisms to rearm European countries, warning this would require no less than €100 billion (Calvo, 2024). The most notable of these initiatives include: starting to subsidise military industries through the European Defence Fund (EDF) which has a 2021-2027 budget of €8 billion and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) to improve Member States' defence competitivity. The European Investment Bank (EIB) (whose President, Nadia Calvino, is from Spain), changed its statutes to be able to finance military industries. It made €8 billion available to boost Europe's arms production and proposed injecting €6 billion (of which €2 billion have already been assigned) through the Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (Soriano, 2024). VAT and special taxes have been lifted from arms transactions inside the common market (Noticias Jurídicas, 2023) where defence equipment purchases are coordinated between countries and are at least 40%; 50% of the national defence budget has been assigned to public contracts for products manufactured in Europe; and at least 35% of the defence goods sold must be between EU countries (DW, 2024). The European Cen-

tral Bank proposed issuing bonds to help Member States carry out joint arms purchases and thus avoid excessive dependence on the USA's military defence industry. This proposal has not yet been approved and currently 60% of all European arms are purchased from America (Navarro, 2024).

There are more things to be alarmed about. ICAN's annual report on military nuclear weapons spending states that the nine countries with nuclear weapons spent US$91.4 billion on modernising and expanding their arsenals in 2024. These nine include three European countries: Russia (US$8.3 billion), UK (US$8.058 billion) and France (US$6.06 billion). Furthermore, nuclear companies invested US$6.3 million lobbying and influencing government policies and public opinion to support nuclear rearmament (ICAN, 2024).

Such widespread rearmament turns EU Member State's economies into an economy of war. Some may see this as an exaggeration as each entire economy is not serving war, but armament has become a European policy priority. Nevertheless, the fact that military spending reached the colossal figure of €289.3 billion in 2023 (a 21.3% increase from 2022), demonstrates the truth of our assertion. Adding in non-EU countries: Norway and the UK (€77.323 billion) takes NATO's European military expenditure to €366.623 billion. This is the second highest spend in the world, behind the USA (€900 billion) and way above Russia (€100 billion) (Nian et al, 2024).

Increased military and arms spending is no guarantee of increased security, rather the opposite: it opens the way to more insecurity, new conflicts and perhaps new wars. Military spending also sucks resources away from the fight against climate change, actions to reduce inequalities, to improve gender equality, health, social services and to harmonise salaries.

The *Si vis pacem, para* argument launched by EU governments (if you want peace, security and freedom, invest in defence), is a fallacy. History shows that increased armament, warmongering and militarism is always the prelude to war. Which is why increasing military spending, encouraging the military industry to acquire more arms and demonstrating military power is a suicidal policy that leads inevitably to escalating tension, an arms race and a warmongering spiral that may lead to war in a nuclear context.

The results of the 9 June 2024 EU elections brought no changes that suggest rearmament policies are about to change, rather the contrary. Nothing suggests that common sense and logic are about to take over EU policies, or that it is about to build peace and security using the route recommended by the UN: détente, cooperation, peaceful coexistence and disarmament, to build a shared international security. This is why we need to combine our efforts, so that social movements, peace organisations and centres can build a European peace movement that puts the break on our current economy of war, to transform it into an economy of peace.

1.2 A LONG-TERM MILITARISATION PROJECT

Jordi Calvo

EU militarisation did not start in response to the war in Ukraine, it has been building for over two decades. A European security doctrine has been built through a military prism under the pretext of trying to achieve greater EU autonomy in security and defence. While community defence budgets have increased to unprecedented levels under the new legitimising framework provided mainly by the war in Ukraine.

One of the starting points for EU security and defence doctrine is the European defence policy supported by the EU High Representative's 2003 strategic document *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, updated in 2016 by the EU Global Strategy *Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe* (European External Action Service, 2016).

The European Commission also launched the *European Defence Action Plan* and *European Defence Fund* in 2016 (European Commission, 2016 and n.d.), which became the first European defence budget in 2021, with €8 billion for the first EU military R&D programme.

Currently, the documents shaping actual European military development are the *EU Security Union Strategy* 2020-25 (European Commission, 2020b), which was the forerunner of the *European Peace Facility* (European Council, n.d.), a cooperation budget to promote military capabilities in Southern countries where European military operations are being carried out, with an initial 2021 budget of €5 billion.

Secondly, increased EU military spending was planned and has been constant for over twenty years. EU security and defence budgets increased to €2.8 billion under the 2007-2013 budget, €6.5 billion under the 2014-2020 budget and €19.5 billion under the current 2021-27 framework programme (Ruiz et al., 2021). In 2017, PESCO - the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence, set a target for all EU Member States to increase their spending on defence and military operations. Europe's military budget is also fed by other sources, such as the 2018 measures adopted to promote military mobility, with the arms industry receiving funds that used to be exclusively civilian (European Commission, 2020c). To which €500 million can now be added for the Action in Support of Am-

munition Production (ASAP) project, which obviously stands for as soon as possible and promotes the manufacture of explosives, missiles and projectiles for European arsenals following the massive supply of arms to Ukraine.

All this without counting on the successive increases under the war in Ukraine, such as the successive increases in the European Peace Facility destined to provide Ukraine with military support, which in September 2024 has already reached €39 billion (European Council, 2024).

The military industry's proactive role must also be taken into account in the militarisation of European policy. In 2002, in the framework of the Convention on the Future of Europe, a Defence Working Group comprising exclusively pro-armament members and lobbyists, laid the foundations for the creation of the European Defence Agency. A year later, in 2003, the Group of Personalities on European defence research was formed. Of its 25 members, 8 belonged to the military and security industry (Ruiz et al, 2020). Not content with the degree of participation in these influential defence policy creation groups, in 2015, the European Commission created the High-level Group of Personalities on defence research with 16 members, 9 of whom represented the military industry (Indra, Leonardo, TNO, Saab, BAE Systems, ASD, MBDA, Airbus and Fraunhofer). It was no surprise that its conclusions pointed to "reinforcing Europe's overall military position" (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016). To such an extent that the 2016 Global Strategy (European External Action Service, 2017), emphasised the importance of supporting the development of the EU's military and security industry. Shortly afterwards, in 2019, the European Commission created the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space to support Europe's military industry.

The enormous implications and impact of Europe's arms industries results from investments by the continent's principal arms companies (Airbus, ASD, BAE Systems, EOS Leonardo, Rolls Royce, MBDA, Naval Group, Rheinmentall, Saab, Safran, and Thales), which spent over €5 million on 49 arms industry lobbyists, who had 327 meetings with European institutions on this subject in 2020 alone (Ruiz et al., 2021). Perhaps for this reason, the EU's main strategic document on security and defence for the next few years, the famous Strategic Compass, introduced 'Next Generation Capabilities', referring to military technological innovation, with the aim of progressing towards industrial sovereignty in military technology, explicitly mentioning the development of new systems and battle tanks or surveillance boats, among others (European External Action Service, 2021).

The 2022 Strategic Compass also maintained and promoted EU-NATO cooperation, reinforcing the transatlantic connection through High Level EU-NATO meetings. This relationship is directly related to military missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has helped NATO recover its legitimacy and protagonism.

However, Europe's dependence on NATO in peace and security makes it incapable of evaluating the risks and threats to its security without the influence of the United States, (i.e. without taking North American interests into account). Each side of the Atlantic has different needs, just as the threats and challenges in terms of security and defence at Europe's different latitudes are also different.

EU military operations above all interest its great military powers, notably France, which has traditionally had the greatest international military reach, as well as other countries like Spain interested in reducing the costs of maintaining an international military presence. In any case, the creation of European Defence and an EU army is not institutionally possible (Morillas, 2018). Europe's greatest and indeed all her armies are not going to give up their national military power. Europe's rapid response combat force is called on to be a European army with the objective of carrying out military operations in places where national armies don't wish to intervene due to internal political controversies or social disapproval of sending national citizens to fight abroad.

Current extreme levels of EU militarisation are no accident. Security and defence doctrines have been developed under the pretext of achieving greater autonomy in this area. While European autonomy is essential, the EU's current proposal offers no real autonomy from American security, beyond ever-increasing community and Member State defence budgets. US and NATO influence have not facilitated peace building in Europe. In fact, the unlimited militarisation of the Western bloc promoted by NATO increases hypothetical political rivals' perceptions of threat. Meanwhile, developing a common EU military budget multiplies arms company profits on both sides of the Atlantic.

1.3 REDUCING THE EUROPEAN ARMS TRADE

Wendela de Vries

Conflicts are an inevitable part of human society, but the way in which we manage them is a choice. Policies should be orientated towards preventing violent responses to conflict and creating situations in which these can be addressed through negotiations,

diplomacy, mediation and restorative justice. The abundance of arms in conflict situations increases the risk of a violent response. Although arms imports are not a genuine conflict cause, they significantly increase the likelihood of violence. Weapons are not dissuasive, they lead to conflict escalation (Pamp et al., 2018) Limiting the arms trade would increase non-violent conflict responses' chances of success.

The Member States recognise that arms are no ordinary merchandise, but might "be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability" in their *Common Position defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment*, the main framework regulating the European arms trade. It sets out the criteria Member States must consider before taking export decisions. The EU wants to set "high common standards which shall be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military technology and equipment by all Member States". (European Council, 2008). The Common Position is legally binding on all Member States and followed by aligned countries such as Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Canada, North Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway (EEAS, 2023). After Brexit, the United Kingdom replaced the EU Common Position's export criteria with vaguer and even more subjective national criteria (Brooke-Holland, 2023).

European countries also committed to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to establish "the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms; prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion" as a contribute to peace, security and stability, to reducing human suffering and to build confidence among States Parties (United Nations, 2014).

And yet, Europe is the world's second biggest arms exporter after the United States, responsible for approximately one third of the world's arms exports (SIPRI, 2024). In 2021, EU countries exported military goods worth €35 billion). This figure rose to €36 billion in 2022, including €4.8 billion[2] for Ukraine (ENAAT, 2024). Many of the main countries to which EU arms are exported have a questionable reputation on human rights, democracy, human development; and participate in armed conflicts. Implementation of the EU Common Position on arms exports falls short in terms of restrictions that help provide peaceful responses to internal and international conflicts (Akkerman, 2021).

Current European policies do not aim to restrict or control arms exports, but to improve the competitive position of the European military industry in the world market, as, in the words of the main EU defence industry lobbyist: ASD "These exports play a vital role in sustaining the competitive economic performance of the European defence industry, considering the relatively modest size of domestic European markets and the substantial development costs involved" (ASD, 2023). In other words, Europe's internal market is too small for a commercially viable arms industry that can compete with other arms exporters, especially the United States, with its huge internal market.

Europe not only increasingly finances and supports its arms industry, it also violates the peace and human rights safeguards on arms exports, arguing that a strong military industry should not be obstructed by the 'bureaucracy' of export controls. The (not particularly restrictive) arms exports policy is therefore mined. This leads to increased violence and human rights violations, and will force more people to flee their homes. To prevent these refugees from entering the safety of Europe, border control is being intensified with military control technology, produced by the military industry.

Weakening arms export controls is a slippery process that largely goes unnoticed as the Common Position and ATT remain in force. While some countries maintain their commitment to restrictions, the scope and method of applying this policy are changing. The brutal wars in Ukraine and Gaza provide arguments for giving free rein to exporters' interests, at the expense of peace and human rights. Countries like Norway and Switzerland, which are traditionally very strict, abandoned their policy of not exporting arms to conflict regions in response to the war in Ukraine. When Turkish President Erdogan threatened to block their entry into NATO, Sweden and Finland raised the arms embargo they imposed on Turkey in response to its involvement in the war in Syria. Other European governments ended bans on arms exports to Saudi Arabia and other countries involved in the war in Yemen. For example, Germany, which relaunched exports to Saudi Arabia in an attempt to secure energy imports from the Gulf States following sanctions on Russia. Although the German government initially continued to block Eurofighter exports, the ban on exporting these planes was lifted following Hamas' massacre on 7 October 2023 as Germany argued that Saudi Arabia makes a significant contribution to Israel's security. In response, the Danish government also ended its ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the UAE in order to be "to be more in line with other European countries, so that the Danish defence industry has the opportunities to participate in international competition" (Farjon, 2024).

2. ENAAT Member States arms export database: https://enaat.org/eu-export-browser/faq

The European Commission plays a notable role in undermining arms exports controls. Its 2024 European Defence Industry Strategy and European Defence Industry Programme announce that the Commission will "take actions to facilitate the intra-EU transfers of defence-related products in EU-funded projects and seek to simplify the management of transfer licensing conditions and processes, in particular by introducing clauses on transfers in the concerned Model Grant Agreement with the aim of limiting the recourse to end-user certificates" (European Commission, 2021-I). Individual European countries will no longer be able to oppose the export of military material to countries that are aggressive or violate human rights. When it comes to jointly produced military goods, only countries with an over-20% share in the production have to assess the exports, which in practice leaves all of the smaller countries with no control and makes it easy to export from the country with the lowest human rights and peace thresholds. The Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation and Integration launched by Merkel and Macron at the Airbus fighter jet factory in Toulouse in 2020, in order to end the polemic over the export of combat planes to Saudi Arabia, was one model for this 'simplified policy' (Broek, 2021). The Treaty has the potential to become a new European model - it has already been signed by Spain and is being considered by the Netherlands.

The European Union and her Member States' governments have adopted an export-based business model for their military industries. This is the result of years of intense lobbying by the military industry, beginning in 2010 and accelerating after Russia's war in Ukraine (Akkerman & Meulewaeter, 2023). In the EU it was DG Industry that first shaped the outlines of this policy, a clear indication that industrial interest, not security, is in the lead in arms industry policy. At first, the European Commission used an economic narrative to legitimise its measures to support military production, asserting that the arms industry would create jobs and technological innovation. Research proving that investment in education and health would create more jobs (presumably more for women than men) and that the military industry is not very innovative, but actually mostly uses innovative civil technology, have been conveniently ignored (Ruiz *et al*., 2021). The narrative has moved onto military arguments since Donald Trump's presidency of the United States, and with even greater force following Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. In the words of EU President Von der Leyen, the world "is as dangerous as it has been for generations" and "Europe must spend more, spend better, spend European." on arms (European Commission, 2024-II).

However, there is no reason to suppose that greater military production and procurement will make Europeans safer. On the contrary: an arms industry that depends on global exports will make the world more violent and less safe. What's more, it is sucking human and financial resources away from civil projects, especially those designed to protect Europe from a much graver threat to our security, such as the climate crisis. Instead of investing in an exports-based arms industry, Europe should convert its military industry into a productive, civil, low-carbon emissions industry - emissions from the EU military industry oscillated between 9.56 and 12.94 megatons of equivalent CO2 in 2019 (Parkinson & Cottrell, 2021). This conversation should take place in cooperation with the trades unions representing workers in this sector.

The arms trade should be restricted and export controls, such as the EU Common Position should be applied to all individual military goods and components. In order to allow democratic control, export licenses must be granted by a transparent national agency that not only responds to industrial or military needs, but also includes human rights and peace considerations. Expert peace and human rights organisations should have access to all the data and be able to discuss exports with the politicians responsible for them and the general public. Arms exports have a major impact on peace and security and should be part of public debate.

Limiting the global availability of arms will force conflicting sides to find other options than violence. A policy that restricts arms exports not only protects people in the countries importing them. In a globalised world with increasing great power rivalries, a policy that restricts arms exports avoids conflict escalation and protects Europe's security.

2. ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY SECURITY

2.1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY NEEDED FOR PEACE

Jordi Calvo

A history plagued by war and, after the Cold War, the failure to build a Europe in which there is no room for more war following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union may lead us to think that war is an inevitable social disease we have to put up with and humanity a lost cause, without any critical consideration of whether this is true. However, there are alternative ways of looking at how to manage our security than the hegemonic discourse based on warmongering culture that legitimises violence to achieve political goals. There are critical studies, obstinate about ending war, that analyse the reasons why the traditional security and defence model creates the violence it aims to prevent and takes us into wars it has promised to avoid. We are therefore going to look at some of the main security criticism, in order to build an alternative security for peace, in contrast to the doctrine of security for war currently dominant in most countries. These critical views of security could serve to achieve peace in Europe.

SECURITY CRITICISM THAT UPHOLDS SECURITY FOR PEACE

Security criticism provides alternatives to hegemonic military security. These studies have evolved to include elements not identified by traditional security seen from a military standpoint. In the 1970s, the discipline of peace and conflict studies founded by Johan Galtung began covering non-military aspects of security, adding critical focuses from feminism and post-structuralism. One basic element of its contribution was the identification of non-military threats to security, showing that the state is not the only model of security (Galtung, 1969). It therefore included global threats to economic, environmental and demographic security, leading to the recognition of the existence of a multitude of interdependent actors who base their relations on cooperation (Tickner, 1992).

Security criticism came to prominence in the context of post-Cold War liberal optimism and the increasing globalisation of the 1980s and 1990s. This period

was also a great time for multilateral organisations, with the expansion of United Nations peace-keeping operations and broad acceptance of the human rights framework (Kaldor, 1999). Along with the theory emerging from post-colonial, feminist, and ecological/environmental studies, security criticism became more influential, questioning the national and military focus of state security (Wyn Jones, 1999).

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) put forward the concept of Human Security, which it measures using development indicators. Human Security describes a quantitative relationship between security and development, and includes transformative elements such as cooperation, multilateralism, human rights and the consolidation of peace. This focus defies the dominant discourses on national security, defence against enemies and relations based on power (UNDP, 1994).

The Welsh School (Booth, 2007) focuses on the relationship between knowledge and power, and argues that theories and knowledge are not neutral, they are created by specific individuals serving someone. It proposes security based on human emancipation to achieve social transformation (Booth, 2005). The Copenhagen School (Buzan *et al.*, 1998) was the first to analyse militarised security and its treatment of humanitarian or social situations as a military threat, showing that this approach results in their being treated as enemies and subject to securitisation. According to these authors security is "a self-referential practice... (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)... The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done..." (p.23-28). In other words, securitisation is the process through which the security forces, soldiers and the means at their disposal are used to manage humanitarian and social situations.

A revealing example of the real scope of securitisation is found in the main threats identified in the various European security doctrines. After 2022, in addition to Russia, NATO's new Strategic Concept identifies international terrorism, particularly groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, cyberattacks and malicious activities in cyberspace, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid threats, strategies that combine military and non-military methods such as disinformation, economic war, and undercover operations to destabilise regional conflicts in particular and tensions and conflicts in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa. The main threats identified in the EU's Strategic Compass include geopolitical competition, meaning the growing strength of powers such as China and Russia, regional crises and instability in regions neighbouring the EU such as the Middle East, the Western Balkans and the Sahara, the threat of both Islamic terrorism and internal political extremism, cyberthreats affecting critical European infrastructure, democratic institutions and companies, hybrid threats, the impacts of climate change and natural disasters that can exacerbate conflicts, cause mass displacement of people and affect the security and stability of neighbouring regions, and energy security, which is seen as a threat given our dependence on external energy sources.

A long list of threats is an indicator of securitisation, as the generalised feeling of insecurity requires exceptional and widespread security measures, which allow the use of military tools to manage humanitarian crises and climate challenges. This leads leaders to identify a need for canons to defend ourselves against the consequences of climate change, instead of taking the necessary measures to avoid global warming and its impacts, which require humanitarian measures to attend to affected populations (Buzan et al., 1998).

The Paris School criticises how security and fear are used for social control (Buzan et al., 1998). Together with Foucault's *Biopolitics* (2007) which argues that the global hegemony of liberal governance's power-based relations controls people in the Global South using the apparently critical mechanisms (such as Human Security,) promoted by multilateral organisations, along with humanitarian interventions and the Duty to Protect.

The contributions made by post-colonial, feminist and environmental studies are also important. Post-colonial Security Studies criticise Western-centric focuses based on the State and Western racism, whose necropower leads to necropolitics that, contrary to their stated intentions, lead to greater insecurity (Mbembe, 2003). Feminist theory introduces criticism of the marginalisation of women and gender in security studies, highlighting that patriarchy influences global security, creating a world that is not exactly safer. (Tickner, 1992). Feminist theory also includes gender as a category for analysing security to construct security based on women's experiences. It highlights the hierarchy and domination involved in gender identities, which reproduce violence and insecurities (Sjoberg, 2013). Last but not least, green theory argues for environmentally sustainable security, advocating for the transition from anthropocentric to post-human security, in order to protect the whole biosphere (Dalby, 2002).

The arms or military economic cycle's critical focus (Oliveres, 2000) suggests that decisions on the military structure a country needs (involving greater or lesser volumes of military spending), must not only to be considered inertia, (which increases annual spending due to inflation without any political debate), but should also include a theoretical justifications supported by adequate geopolitical analysis (Oliveres, 2000). This justification is found in national security and defence doctrines, which regularly analyse and identify threats and risks to national security. The question lies in who decides and/or decisively influences the list of threats and their priority: the military industry's interest in obtaining increased budgets is undeniable. Numerous military industry lobbying activities are carried out by private companies and business organisations who have millions of euros to spend on influencing political decisions every year (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2011).

Security studies question the kind of security we're talking about, who decides it, who controls the narrative, who is to be secured and who becomes a target. This discipline identifies and alerts us to the tendency to develop necrosecurity, which despite its stated aims, tends to create more death, leading to social control through fear produced by the proliferation of threats and the promotion of pseudoconflicts (Cascón, 2001). Security studies recommend transitioning from patriarchal to feminist security, from warmongering to pacifist security and from anthropocentric nation-based security to biosecurity (Sjoberg, 2013; Tickner, 1992).

FOR NON-WARMONGERING, NON-MILITARISED SECURITY

Let's define military security in order to show the alternatives provided by a hypothetical pacifist or peace-culture based approach to security, to explore what a non-militarised peace doctrine and security would look like in Europe.

Military security is based on the notion of negative peace, defined as the absence of personal and symbolic violence, structural inequality and injustice. Domination or the hegemony of power is a key part of this approach, which seeks to align other actors under a dominant power (Waltz, 1979). This results in the prevalence of deterrence strategies and competition between nations, mistrust, isolation and protectionism. Nationalism also plays a crucial role in war and security, as it reinforces the idea of national security through sovereignty and self-sufficiency (Mearsheimer, 2001). Military security is key in neoliberal globalisation, which although showing signs of fatigue and even a degree of deglobalisation (Setser, 2024), lives alongside colonialist and neo-colonialist tendencies, where the more powerful nations exercise influence and control over less developed nations (Harvey, 2005). The military security framework is inherently linked to patriarchal structures, which perpetuate dynamics of power and domination (Tickner, 1992). Military security belongs to the view arguing that peace can be achieved by violent means (Galtung, 1969), supported by a correspondingly warring culture.

The realist theory of international relations is based on a reading of international politics grounded in mistrust, competition and chaos. It supports many of the decisions leading nations to use military confrontation to achieve their objectives. However, this vision is obsolete in a world where security does not depend on the number of weapons possessed (Galtung, 1985). As Martínez Guzmán (2001) affirmed "We pacifists are the realists, because we have alternatives, we have responsibilities, we can decide whether or not to make peace or war".

Security that seeks peace (not war), or security based on peace culture, is a theoretical and practical approach from the field of security and international relations studies, that underlines the importance of building and keeping peace through non-violent means. It is based on creating conditions that prevent armed conflict using peaceful dispute resolution, international cooperation and the development of mutual trust and understanding between nations.

From an academic perspective, pacifist security is defined as emphasising positive peace. It is the opposite of negative peace, (which simply means the absence of war) and refers to the presence of social, economic and political justice. This includes the elimination of structural violence, i.e. inequalities and injustices that may give rise to conflicts that lead to violence (Galtung, 1969), as well as the reduction of cultural violence. Pacifist security prioritises conflict prevention through diplomatic measures and negotiations, promoting trust and cooperation between international players through international communication and compliance with international agreements (Kriesberg, 1998). Pacifist security advocates for global justice, respect of human rights, and demilitarisation, promoting reductions in the armed forces and military spending, and arguing that true security is achieved through investments in human and social development, not by stockpiling weapons. Security founded in peace culture demonstrates the need for international cooperation and multilateralism, which includes active participation in international organisations and compliance with international norms and treaties. Peaceful security must include women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups in its design,

as a strategy for the construction of safer, more just societies (Tickner, 1992) that avoid aggravations that may lead to the legitimisation of the use of violence, and break the patriarchy's influence over militarised security.

As we have shown, pacifist security is based on the concept of positive peace, defined as the presence of structural justice and a culture of peace, characterised by optimism and conflict prevention by peaceful means (Galtung, 1969). This focus emphasises the balance of power in international relations. Pacifists see genuine realism as implying the use of pacifism to achieve peace, instead of depending on violent deterrence (Galtung, 1985). Decolonialisation and feminism also play essential roles in securing peace, defying traditional power structures and defending gender equality and peoples' self-determination (Said, 1978, Tickner, 1992).

The critical alternatives aiming to build a security that is not based on warmongering or militarisation, feed into what could be pacifist security. They define human security as human rather than national development. This approach is based on cooperation, multilateralism, human rights and the consolidation of peace. Human security differs from national security in that it focuses on individual needs and rights (Kaldor, 2007). It also argues that this should be a feminist security, to end women's and gender-based marginalisation in security studies. Realism was created by and for men, excluding women's experiences. So including gender as a category for analysing security allows us to build security based on women's experiences and perspectives (Tickner, 1992).

Pacifist security must also be green security, overcoming anthropocentrism and moving towards post-human security. This implies considering environmental security, biosphere security as a whole, and promoting environmentally sustainable practices. Biosecurity or environmental security aims to ensure the survival and well-being of all living creatures and the planet (Floyd & Matthew, 2013).

It is possible to promote pacifist security, based on non-violence, disarmament, demilitarisation and the construction of the conditions for peace and justice between countries, using a focus that aims to abolish war from international relations, and promotes peaceful conflict resolution and international cooperation (Galtung, 1989).

Security for war vs. Security for peace

War-based/military security	Pacifist/peace-culture based security
Negative peace: absence of personal and symbolic violence, structural inequality and injustice: peace can be achieved by violent means	Positive peace: structural justice, culture of peace, optimistic, preventative, peace through peaceful means
Domination/hegemony of power and adhesion to the dominant discourse	Power balanced
Game theory	Coordination games - communication, empathy
Theory of (fake) realism	(Genuine) realism of using pacifism to achieve positive peace
Mistrust, isolation	Generation of trust
Competitivity	Cooperation
Protectionism	Fair trade
Nationalism	Internationalism
Neoliberal globalisation	Global justice
Colonialism - neocolonialism	Decolonisation
Patriarchy	Feminism
Culture of defence	Culture of peace
Nation-centric	Life-centric
External military threats	Careful international relations
Rational and realist	Feminist and pacifist
Dissuasion and defence	International cooperation

Source: Own creation

Security for peace must be based on the culture of peace. This is focused on life, on creation rather than destruction and killing, on careful international relations. It's based on feminist, decolonisation theories and on the culture of peace, which is the key tool for international cooperation. While war-based or military security is founded on a culture of war that justifies the use of violence, promotes the need to defend states from external military threats, and is justified by (unrealistically) realist theory, and alleged political rationalism, and whose main tool for preventing war is deterrence: a strategy that only accumulates successive failures.

2.2 FROM THE ECONOMY OF WAR TO POLITICS FOR PEACE

Pere Brunet

Most EU politicians maintain a warring discourse. Their views are based on the hypothesis that Vladimir Putin has territorial ambitions, which could trigger a European or even World War. Our politicians have therefore committed to investing more in defence for "more security, more peace and more freedom in Europe".[3]

But recent history uses other words. In 1992, only three years after the fall of the Berlin wall, 1,700 independent scientists, including 104 Nobel prize

3. Ortega, P. (2024), *The European Union's Economy of War*, included in this report.

winners (Brunet, 2024a), published a *Warning to Humanity* (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992). They urged us to reduce environmental destruction and significantly change our way of managing the earth and life, declaring that "Success in this global endeavour will require a great reduction in violence and war. Resources now devoted to the preparation and conduct of war... will be badly needed in the new tasks and should be diverted to the new challenges." Their words came at a time of great optimism. In June 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev gave the Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo, in which he talked extensively and profoundly of the need for peace to prevail above all other considerations, expressing his confidence that the world would adopt solidarity and change, as the ways to face global challenges. As Federico Mayor Zaragoza (2022) explains, Gorbachev presented Ronald Reagan with the idea of disarmament, including the end of the arms race and nuclear warheads. Gorbachev said: "We live on the same planet. Europe is our shared home: a home, not a battlefield."

There have been constant warnings about the potential consequences of NATO expansion towards Russia. In 1994, Ted Galen Carpenter noted that "It would be extraordinarily difficult to expand NATO eastward without that action's being viewed by Russia as unfriendly... expansion would constitute a needless provocation of Russia" (Carpenter, 2022). And in 1998, George Keenan lamented NATO's fait accompli policy: "I think the Russians will react badly and this will affect their policies. I believe it is a tragic error. There was no reason for this. No-one was threatening anybody." But, in spite of all this, NATO pursued its expansion.

It is impossible to approve Putin's warmongering politics, but we must also remember NATO's expansionist provocations of the past thirty years. Increased defence spending does not contribute to either peace orFaced by our global and transnational challenges, Europe needs a radical, paradigmatic change, to move courageously from the policies dictated by the great arms and transnational lobbies (Bohigas, 2023a) to peaceful policies that lead to the implementation of many (currently silenced) proposals grounded in science and objective observation of the facts. These policies of disarmament and demilitarisation will transfer funds into ambitious programmes designed by and for people, biosphere security and environmental peace. These policies need to be based on the dignity of all people and their rights, on conflict resolution through dialogue and on global collaboration, in order for us to be able to face our extraordinary challenges.[4]

This is a great opportunity for Europe. An opportunity to return to its founding principles,[5] to build, promote and export a new kind of human geopolitics, based on science and global democracy. We need to leave the current warring economy behind and promote post-violent multilateralism on a global scale, to achieve mutual respect and dignity for all people..

2.3 FROM DETERRENCE TO DETENTE

Tica Font

Various EU presidents and ministers declare we have to prepare for a potential Russian invasion, that Russia is a threat to Europe, that we need to arm and prepare for war. The drums of war are beating at the heart of the European Union. They're insisting we have to place Europe's economy on a war footing, we must buy more arms and boost military production.

They say Russia may invade another EU country, Russia may launch a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, on European soil. Perhaps somebody believes this, but it does seem incredible. It doesn't look as if Ukraine is going to win the war in Ukraine, but it doesn't look as if Russia is going to win it either. In the best-case scenario, we're heading for long-term combats of sporadic intensity. This makes the scenario in which Russia would want to start a war against the EU complicated: it would be suicide for everyone. Everything seems to suggest that the aim is to generate fear of a Russian invasion, which will allow the implementation of certain defence policies without public opposition.

Deterrence is a relationship-based military strategy resulting from the interactions between two or more states, in which the dissuader shows their adversary that they have greater destructive capabilities, that they are more powerful, and that their adversary (or the party deterred) must desist from carrying out a particular action or assume the consequent costs and damages. The dissuader's ultimate objective is to influence the other party's assessment of the risks and benefits of carrying out their threatened actions (Jordan, 2022).

Deterrence comes with threatening, coercive rhetoric: you have to appear strong to make the threats seem credible, and display greater destructive power than your opponent. The dynamic of deterrence goes hand in hand with escalations in the aggression, declarations, threats, and coercion used, plus an arms race. Both sides must design new arms and increase their investments in producing and stockpiling weapons in

4. Global warming, desertification, loss of biodiversity, pandemics and much more. All these global, transborder challenges require multilateral international cooperation action.

5. The European Union's founding values include respect, tolerance, gender equality, cooperation and dialogue as a way of addressing international disputes, thus promoting their practice.

order to prevent the "other side" from attacking. This is part of the threat strategy and makes their rhetoric credible. Credibility is essential to deterrence. The adversary must believe that the threat is credible, and that it is very likely to be carried out.

As we have said, the strategy of deterrence aims to either prevent an adversary from carrying out new actions due to the threat of retaliation or to avoid another country carrying out something you do not wish them to do. Deterrence is a psychological game, related to mastery of the art of deceit. It peaked during the Cold War, when nuclear weapons had to be constantly ready for action, in order to give credibility to the threat that they might be used.

In military terms, deterrence involves using a strategy of coercion, intimidation and of creating fear of the potential damage as a motive to avoid or influence your adversary's military and political strategy, as opposed to the strategy of military victory. Deterrence is fundamentally a game of poker in which you make your adversary believe you have a great hand to encourage them to fold, out of the belief that if they carry on raising the stakes, they will incur even greater losses. Deterrence is based on calculations concerning your opponent's behaviour.

NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept (Ministerio de Defensa, 2022) updates the concept of deterrence "NATO's deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities" (paragraph 20). "We will significantly strengthen our deterrence and defence posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression. To that end, we will ensure a substantial and persistent presence on land, at sea, and in the air, including through strengthened integrated air and missile defence. We will deter and defend forward with robust in-place, multi-domain, combat-ready forces, enhanced command and control arrangements, prepositioned ammunition and equipment and improved capacity and infrastructure to rapidly reinforce any Ally, including at short or no notice" (paragraph 21). This definition is tougher, more energetic, and anticipatory. It is not reactive, it is responsive and contemplates military responses in all areas: on land, at sea and in the air, in cyberspace and real space, using both conventional and unconventional means (known as hybrid warfare).

It is this kind of deterrence that seems to be infiltrating the EU. This March 2024, the European Commission published the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), complete with objectives and indicators. This strategy aims to:

- **Boost military production**: The EU s military industry must produce greater volume, for which it has requested two things: loans to expand facilities and contracts signed years in advance to ensure production. To meet this objective, the EU decided to open credit lines, for example Eurobonds, or to change the European Investment Bank's statutes in order to provide liquidity to expand these industries.
- **Promote joint procurement from EU industry:** The European Union is starting to prepare its organisations and structure to be able to coordinate the procurement of military equipment produced in the EU on behalf of all 27 Member States. This process began with missiles for Ukraine, but the necessary architecture is being implemented to allow it to continue. The Commission set targets for 2030: 40% of EU military procurement should be jointly carried out; 35% of the EU market should be defence; 50% of Member States' defence spending should go to the EU military industry, rising to 60% by 2050. In short, it wants 50-60% of the increased military spending approved by the 27 Member States to go to European industry (rather than the United States).
- **Boost or assist Member States' arms spending**: to which end measures allowing states to borrow money to spend on arms will be implemented, through Eurobonds or EIB loans, subsidies for joint procurement, and arrangements allowing debt incurred in order to purchase arms to not be included in public deficit calculations (otherwise known as creative accounting); or considering lifting VAT on weapons sales. European women will pay VAT on feminine hygiene products and baby formula, but not on arms.

All these measures are designed to warn Russia and any other power that the EU is preparing for war, that it has the capacity to fight a war, and that they should refrain from attacking us.

Deterrence is presented as a strategy for preventing war; but deterrence does not help avoid conflict, address opposing interests, or reduce the risk of escalation. The Cold War was conducted along the lines of deterrence. If we learned anything over those 30 years, it was that deterrence did not serve to resolve the conflicts between the two powers, or to find solutions to the apparent (real or subjective) incompatibility of their interests. Deterrence did not and does not find peaceful solutions to conflicts.

The question is, can we change tack? Instead of highlighting the incompatibility between our interests, can we find shared economic, cultural or ideological perspectives as an alternative to threatening, intimidat-

ing and coercing our adversaries? Can we find what unites us? Find sources of dialogue? Politics exists as a means of establishing dialogue and jointly managing and bringing diverse interests into agreement, to ensure dialogue prevails over confrontation. Citizens' daily experience shows us that community and social justice are not built on threats, intimidation or coercion. Peace cannot be imposed; peace is a collective human construct.

Before engaging in military threats or interventions, we need to weigh what would happen if these threats were carried out. We need to know the scale of the potential disaster, and whether rhetorical and military de-escalation is viable.

The EU will spend significant amounts of financial, human and intellectual resources developing military capabilities, on having more powerful armies with greater capabilities and greater firepower. It has yet to abandon the concept of deterrence and the "and I've got more than you have" approach. We are still playing the psychological game (like in poker), making our enemies believe we have the upper hand, while the stakes are getting higher, and the danger of committing errors grows.

We citizens don't want to fall victim to these games. Détente is the best policy in the face of deterrence. We need to stop arms races, stop threatening rhetoric and open the way to dialogue and mutual trust.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The realist theory of international relations, which is based on mistrust, competition and chaos lies behind many of the decisions leading the EU and many European states to choose military confrontation as the way to achieve their objectives.

But this vision is obsolete in a world where security does not depend on the size of your arsenal. The realist military route has led Europe into an avoidable war that will financially impoverish her population, create unbearable humanitarian damage and politically fracture the continent, increasing European dependence on United States security in the process.

POLICIES OF DÉTENTE, COOPERATION AND POSITIVE PEACE

European identity has changed over the past twenty years. It has moved away from its founding principles through a securitising response to threats and risks that do not require a military response. It has built a vision of European security and defence through a militarised lens, focused on national security instead of the security of human beings, nature and our future generations.

Completing EU militarisation will do away with any semblance EU credibility in promoting peace and human rights. A military Europe will make the Union's militarised responses more frequent. This will hinder Europe's diplomatic abilities to create conditions that avoid armed conflicts and promote peace, to create relationships based on friendship, co-existence and interdependence with our neighbouring states.

The fight for global military hegemony will suck essential resources away from Europe's development and her population's well-being. The views that greater military spending will prevent war in Europe are unfounded, and the belief that an arms race will protect peace only benefit the arms industry. The arbitrary 2% of GDP military spending target promotes the production and proliferation of arms, although it lacks any justification when it comes to achieving greater levels of peace and security.

We propose Europe approve a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that promotes military missions to support development cooperation in the more deprived regions of countries both inside and outside the EU. We recommend swapping the development of new arms systems that boost the European military industry for the conversion of military production to civilian, human and sustainable production. A policy of security for peace would be more viable if we left the oversight of NATO and the United States and built a European security that is not subordinated to anyone else's needs, which only answers to the needs of Europe's people and territory.

We need to abandon the road to a hypothetical European army and implement a strengthened and credible European diplomatic service, increasing its capabilities and resources in order to carry out greater cooperations between the Member States, to build a diplomacy that serves the interests of the EU, her Member States and her people.

We need to undertake policies of disarmament and demilitarisation in Europe and from Europe. Limiting the availability of arms globally will force conflicting parties to find non-violent solutions. In a globalised world with increasing rivalry between the great powers, fewer arms exports would avoid conflict escalation and benefit European security.

Peace on the old continent means building a great Europe for peace, an autonomous region with a neutral role between Orient and Occident, capable of reducing tensions and the arms race that diverts funds away from human needs (access to housing, education, health, etc). This means including Russia in the European project, under whatever formula can be achieved, as the precondition for a framework of peace and security that will finally and definitively avoid war on the continent.

OVERCOMING NATO PROTECTION WITHOUT A EUROPEAN ARMY

The continent's security has been in the hands of NATO since the end of World War II. We have failed to create our own security framework. Following the disastrous management of the dissolution of the USSR, NATO used the weakness of its traditional enemy to include Russia's former allies, preventing any progress towards the Common European Home promoted by the USSR's last soviet leader: Mikhail Gorbachev.

Europe's dependence on NATO for peace and security makes her incapable of evaluating the security risks and threats. NATO prioritises the needs of the United States, the organisation's unquestionable leader. But each side of the Atlantic has different needs, just as the security and defence threats and challenges are different in Southern and Eastern Europe. Using military means to achieve peace in Europe will mean there are no changes from NATO protection to the security model currently proposed.

European autonomy is essential, but the EU's current proposal includes no real military autonomy from the United States, beyond that which can apparently be demonstrated in increasing EU and Member States' budgets. The European Rapid Deployment Capacity is designed to be a European army to carry out military operations in places where national armies don't want to post troops, due to internal political controversies or public disapproval of sending national citizens on foreign missions.

FROM SECURITY FOR WAR TO SECURITY FOR PEACE

There are many opportunities for using a different approach to European security. Theoretically speaking, European security can be built for peace based on the recommendations provided by security studies. Some of the examples which can be applied to the doctrine of European security include:

- Human Security, which proposes building security from a focus on human development rather than national security. Human Security based on cooperation, multilateralism, human rights, peacebuilding.
- Feminist Security, which proposes ending women and gender marginalisation in security studies (realism by men for men), and including gender as a category of security analysis to build security based on the principles of care and respect within an inclusive, ecofeminist framework.
- European Green Security, which proposes overcoming anthropocentrism to move towards post-human security, a security that protects the whole environment, to achieve sustainable biosphere security.

We recommend changing the focus of European security to include a peace culture perspective that allows us to overcome our current warmongering and militarised security and achieve **security for peace** covering the following considerations:

- We need to go beyond negative peace, which can achieve the absence of violence but does not avoid structural inequality and injustice, and argues that peace can be achieved by violent means. We need to seek positive peace, structural justice, the promotion of a peace culture that prevents violence, does not use violence and achieves peace using peaceful means.

- Security for peace does not seek the domination or hegemony of power: it seeks balance. It trusts, it does not compete, it does not isolate countries, it strengthens communication, coordination and empathy between people.
- Security for peace is based on honest, truthful realism that places the culture of peace in the centre and overcomes the fallacy of the theory of international relations erroneously referred to as 'realist'.
- Security for peace outlines a future of global justice, internationalism, cooperation, fair trade and real decolonisation, without patriarchy.
- It means promoting the culture of peace among people, rather than the culture of defence. It means focusing on life and biodiversity rather than states and elite security.
- Security for peace swaps threat analysis and the desire to pose a threat in order to achieve peace through deterrence, for careful international relations between governments and peoples. It moves from deterrence and defence to international cooperation.
- Security for peace proposes a radical change in our current model, and moves towards a new human geopolitics based on global partnership to face the great transnational threats humanity is facing (environmental crisis, uninhabitable areas of the planet) from the perspective of human dignity. Europe could propose, promote and export these policies of partnership and global democracy.

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

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